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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19089| Title: | Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form : should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed? |
| Keywords: | F23 H73 ddc:330 tax competition multinational firms preferential treatment Steuerwettbewerb Steuerbegünstigung Multinationales Unternehmen Rechtsformwahl Kapitalertragsteuer Extensives Spiel Zwei-Länder-Modell Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | We analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings. Governments are able to commit to long-run tax discrimination policies before firms' decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non-cooperatively. Whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted to mobile firms is beneficial or harmful for the competing countries depends critically on the elasticity with which the firms' organizational structure responds to tax discrimination incentives. The model can be applied to policy initiatives that aim at a ban on preferential tax regimes and at reducing the profit shifting opportunities for multinational firms. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19089 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19089 ppn:509887740 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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