Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19067
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dc.creatorKoskela, Erkki-
dc.creatorStenbacka, Rune-
dc.date2005-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:02:43Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:02:43Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19067-
dc.identifierppn:509687830-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19067-
dc.descriptionWe investigate the implications of product market imperfections on profit sharing, wage negotiation and equilibrium unemployment. The optimal profit share, which the firms use as a wage-moderating commitment device, is below the bargaining power of the trade union. Intensified product market competition decreases profit sharing, but increases the negotiated base wage, because the wage-increasing effect of reduced profit sharing dominates the wage-reducing effect associated with a higher wage elasticity of labor demand. Finally, we show that intensified product market competition does not necessarily reduce equilibrium unemployment, because it induces both higher wage mark-ups and lower optimal profit shares.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationCESifo working papers 1603-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectL11-
dc.subjectJ51-
dc.subjectJ33-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectproduct market competition-
dc.subjectprofit sharing-
dc.subjectwage bargaining-
dc.subjectequilibrium unemployment-
dc.subjectTarifliche Gewinnbeteiligung-
dc.subjectLohnverhandlungstheorie-
dc.subjectWettbewerb-
dc.subjectTheorie der Arbeitslosigkeit-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleProduct market competition, profit sharing and equilibrium unemployment-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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