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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19050| Title: | Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes |
| Keywords: | F23 H25 L23 ddc:330 centralized vs. de-centralized decisions taxes MNEs Multinationales Unternehmen Steuer Organisationsstruktur Transferpreis Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise?s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19050 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19050 ppn:503740586 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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