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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19050Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Nielsen, Søren Bo | - |
| dc.creator | Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis | - |
| dc.creator | Schjelderup, Guttorm | - |
| dc.date | 2005 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:02:36Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:02:36Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19050 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:503740586 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19050 | - |
| dc.description | The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise?s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs - here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument -, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | CESifo working papers 1586 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | F23 | - |
| dc.subject | H25 | - |
| dc.subject | L23 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | centralized vs. de-centralized decisions | - |
| dc.subject | taxes | - |
| dc.subject | MNEs | - |
| dc.subject | Multinationales Unternehmen | - |
| dc.subject | Steuer | - |
| dc.subject | Organisationsstruktur | - |
| dc.subject | Transferpreis | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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