Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19042| Title: | The market for protection and the origin of the state |
| Keywords: | H10 D70 D30 ddc:330 property rights anarchy government Kriminalitätsökonomik Innere Sicherheit Sicherheitsgewerbe Organisierte Kriminalität Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though selfgovernance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19042 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042 ppn:503713147 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.