The market for protection and the origin of the state

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19042

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Konrad, Kai A.	-
dc.creator	Skaperdas, Stergios	-
dc.date	2005	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:02:31Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:02:31Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042	-
dc.identifier	ppn:503713147	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/19042	-
dc.description	We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though selfgovernance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1578	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	H10	-
dc.subject	D70	-
dc.subject	D30	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	property rights	-
dc.subject	anarchy	-
dc.subject	government	-
dc.subject	Kriminalitätsökonomik	-
dc.subject	Innere Sicherheit	-
dc.subject	Sicherheitsgewerbe	-
dc.subject	Organisierte Kriminalität	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	The market for protection and the origin of the state	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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