Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18998| Title: | Succession rules and leadership rents |
| Keywords: | D74 D72 N40 H50 ddc:330 political leadership political support political survival successorship Politiker Regierungswechsel Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie Rent Seeking Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regime and the divide-et-impera regime which differ with respect to the role of supporters of the previous leader once the new leader takes power. The leadership rent is higher and supporters receive a lower compensation in the divide-et-impera regime, as supporters have to fight harder for succession to avoid the grim outcome of loss. A leader, then, would like to induce the divide-et-impera regime even when every supporter has veto power over his leadership. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18998 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18998 ppn:500841365 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.