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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18987Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Haufler, Andreas | - |
| dc.creator | Nielsen, Søren Bo | - |
| dc.date | 2005 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:02:19Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:02:19Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18987 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:50056891X | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18987 | - |
| dc.description | We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | CESifo working papers 1523 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | H77 | - |
| dc.subject | F13 | - |
| dc.subject | L41 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | merger policy | - |
| dc.subject | international trade | - |
| dc.subject | Fusionskontrolle | - |
| dc.subject | Multinationales Unternehmen | - |
| dc.subject | Außenwirtschaft | - |
| dc.subject | Wohlfahrtseffekt | - |
| dc.subject | Marktstruktur | - |
| dc.subject | Gleichgewicht | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Merger policy to promote "global players"? : A simple model | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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