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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18987| Title: | Merger policy to promote "global players"? : A simple model |
| Keywords: | H77 F13 L41 ddc:330 merger policy international trade Fusionskontrolle Multinationales Unternehmen Außenwirtschaft Wohlfahrtseffekt Marktstruktur Gleichgewicht Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger equilibrium. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18987 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18987 ppn:50056891X |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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