Sabotaging potential rivals

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18964

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Amegashie, J. Atsu	-
dc.creator	Runkel, Marco	-
dc.date	2005	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:02:11Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:02:11Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964	-
dc.identifier	ppn:500517312	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18964	-
dc.description	This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1500	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	D74	-
dc.subject	D72	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	all-pay auction	-
dc.subject	elimination contests	-
dc.subject	potential rival	-
dc.subject	sabotage	-
dc.subject	Wirtschaftskriminalität	-
dc.subject	Wettbewerb	-
dc.subject	Auktionstheorie	-
dc.subject	Spieltheorie	-
dc.title	Sabotaging potential rivals	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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