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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18964| Title: | Sabotaging potential rivals |
| Keywords: | D74 D72 ddc:330 all-pay auction elimination contests potential rival sabotage Wirtschaftskriminalität Wettbewerb Auktionstheorie Spieltheorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18964 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964 ppn:500517312 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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