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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18963Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Hedbavny, Petr | - |
| dc.creator | Schneider, Ondřej | - |
| dc.creator | Zapal, Jan | - |
| dc.date | 2005 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:02:11Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:02:11Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18963 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:500516766 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18963 | - |
| dc.description | In this paper, we set out to examine an efficient fiscal-policy framework for a monetary union. We illustrate that fiscal policy?s bias toward budget deficit only temporarily ceased at the end of the 20th century as European countries endeavored to qualify for euro-zone membership, which compelled strict limits on budgetary deficits. We then explore which mechanisms might instill a sense of fiscal disciple in governments. We find that most mechanisms suffer from the incentive-incompatible setup whereby governments restrict their own fiscal-policy freedom. We argue that even multilateral fiscal rules, such as the EU?s Stability and Growth Pact, suffer from the same endogeneity flaw. Consequently, we argue that a fiscal rule must incorporate an external authority that would impartially assess fiscal-policy developments. Using U.S. debt and bond-market data at the state level, we show that financial markets represent a good candidate as, vis-?-vis the American states, they do differentiate state debt according to the level of debt. We thus argue for a fiscal institution??what we call the Fiscal Sustainability Council??that would actively bring financial markets into the fiscal-policy process, and we explain the technique whereby this could be effected. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | CESifo working papers 1499 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | H6 | - |
| dc.subject | H87 | - |
| dc.subject | E6 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | fiscal policy | - |
| dc.subject | European Union | - |
| dc.subject | sustainability | - |
| dc.subject | Finanzpolitik | - |
| dc.subject | EU-Stabilitätspakt | - |
| dc.subject | Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion | - |
| dc.subject | Anreizvertrag | - |
| dc.subject | Finanzmarkt | - |
| dc.subject | Länderrisiko | - |
| dc.subject | EU-Staaten | - |
| dc.title | A fiscal rule that has teeth : a suggestion for a "fiscal sustainability council" underpinned by the financial markets | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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