S-based taxation under default risk

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18960

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Panteghini, Paolo M.	-
dc.date	2005	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:02:11Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:02:11Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18960	-
dc.identifier	ppn:500514798	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18960	-
dc.description	This article studies the characteristics of a S-based tax system under default risk. In particular we show that its neutrality properties depend on whether debt is protected or unprotected. In the former case, this system is neutral. In the latter case, where default timing is optimally chosen by shareholders, the S-based system is neutral with respect to real decisions only if the firm?s and the lender?s tax rate are equal. However, the shareholders? decision to default is always distorted.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1496	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	H32	-
dc.subject	H25	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	capital structure	-
dc.subject	corporate taxation	-
dc.subject	neutrality	-
dc.subject	option pricing	-
dc.subject	Unternehmensbesteuerung	-
dc.subject	Duale Einkommensteuer	-
dc.subject	Zins	-
dc.subject	Steuerbegünstigung	-
dc.subject	Kreditrisiko	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	S-based taxation under default risk	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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