Bid rigging : an analysis of corruption in auctions

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18952

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Lengwiler, Yvan	-
dc.creator	Wolfstetter, Elmar	-
dc.date	2005	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:02:09Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:02:09Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18952	-
dc.identifier	ppn:50046619X	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18952	-
dc.description	In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by the auctioneer after bids have been submitted in order to minimize illegal contact and to realize the maximum gain from corruption.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1488	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	D44	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	auctions	-
dc.subject	procurement	-
dc.subject	corruption	-
dc.subject	right of first refusal	-
dc.subject	numerical methods	-
dc.subject	Auktionstheorie	-
dc.subject	Korruption	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	Bid rigging : an analysis of corruption in auctions	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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