Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18931| Title: | The political economy of corruption and the role of financial institutions |
| Keywords: | O17 D72 D73 ddc:330 corruption financial markets institutions development voting Korruption Public Choice Finanzsektor Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | In transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even if they have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt offcials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead to more corruption as more voters become part of the corrupt system. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18931 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18931 ppn:472779281 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.