Tax morale and optimal taxation

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18922

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Gueth, Werner	-
dc.creator	Sausgruber, Rupert	-
dc.date	2004	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:57Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:57Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18922	-
dc.identifier	ppn:47119123X	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18922	-
dc.description	We study experimentally how taxpayers choose between two tax regimes to fund a public good. The first-best tax regime imposes a general, distortion-free income tax. However, this tax cannot be enforced. The second-best alternative supplements the income tax by a specific commodity tax. This tax cannot be evaded but distorts optimal consumption choices, instead. The result is that a large majority of subjects prefer the general income tax regime. The bulk of votes is consistent with actual payoffs. We isolate tax morale as cause for payoffs above theoretical predictions.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1284	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	H26	-
dc.subject	H21	-
dc.subject	C91	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	optimal taxation	-
dc.subject	tax evasion	-
dc.subject	voting	-
dc.subject	experiments	-
dc.subject	Optimale Besteuerung	-
dc.subject	Steuersystem	-
dc.subject	Steuermoral	-
dc.subject	Wahlverhalten	-
dc.subject	Experiment	-
dc.title	Tax morale and optimal taxation	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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