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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18904| Title: | Fending off one means fending off all : evolutionary stability in submodular games |
| Keywords: | C79 D72 ddc:330 Evolutionäre Spieltheorie Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an intimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability of strategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest - accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game must also be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, any number of mutants can even less do so. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18904 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904 ppn:472458817 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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