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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18904Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Leininger, Wolfgang | - |
| dc.date | 2004 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:01:53Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:01:53Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18904 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:472458817 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18904 | - |
| dc.description | The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an intimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability of strategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest - accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game must also be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, any number of mutants can even less do so. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | CESifo working papers 1266 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | C79 | - |
| dc.subject | D72 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Fending off one means fending off all : evolutionary stability in submodular games | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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