Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18895| Title: | EVA and the controllability-congruence trade-off : an empirical investigation |
| Keywords: | M52 J33 D8 ddc:330 EVA management compensation controllability-congruence trade-off compensation standards Leistungsorientierte Vergütung Führungskräfte Betriebliche Wertschöpfung Leistungsanreiz Leistungskontrolle |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | Incentives theory suggests that compensation schemes should be analyzed along two dimensions: controllability and congruence. Most schemes cannot satisfy both criteria at once. EVA bonus schemes, a major managerial innovation of the 90?s, favor the congruence criterion. This paper questions ist properties along the controllability dimension. The question is addressed through an in-depth case study: after three years in operation the actual bonuses paid by the system, as well as qualitative feedback from the managers involved, are analyzed. It is argued that EVA bonus schemes may have a major controllability problem. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18895 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18895 ppn:396975186 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.