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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18889| Title: | Multiple but asymmetric bank financing : the case of relationship lending |
| Keywords: | G21 G78 G33 ddc:330 relationship lending multiple bank financing lender coordination Fremdkapital Kredit Bank Finanzierung Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoringintensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18889 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18889 ppn:47075415X |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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