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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18889Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Elsas, Ralf | - |
| dc.creator | Heinemann, Frank | - |
| dc.creator | Tyrell, Marcel | - |
| dc.date | 2004 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:01:49Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:01:49Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18889 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:47075415X | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18889 | - |
| dc.description | Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoringintensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | CESifo working papers 1251 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | G21 | - |
| dc.subject | G78 | - |
| dc.subject | G33 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | relationship lending | - |
| dc.subject | multiple bank financing | - |
| dc.subject | lender coordination | - |
| dc.subject | Fremdkapital | - |
| dc.subject | Kredit | - |
| dc.subject | Bank | - |
| dc.subject | Finanzierung | - |
| dc.subject | Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Multiple but asymmetric bank financing : the case of relationship lending | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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