Corrupt local government as resource farmers : the helping hand and the grabbing hand

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18886

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Dalgic, Engin	-
dc.creator	Long, Ngo Van	-
dc.date	2004	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:49Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:49Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18886	-
dc.identifier	ppn:393485943	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18886	-
dc.description	We study the role of tax share and transparency of governance on growth and stagnation. A local government maximizes its private benefits using two activities. The first one consists of providing local public goods that help local firms to increase profits, thus enlarging tax revenue. The second one consists of extortion. We show that there is a threshold level of local government tax share, and a threshold level of transparency. Below these thresholds, the economy will stagnate and above them, the economy will achieve perpetual growth.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1248	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	H41	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	corruption	-
dc.subject	growth	-
dc.subject	local government	-
dc.subject	tax share	-
dc.subject	Kommunalpolitik	-
dc.subject	Korruption	-
dc.subject	Lokales öffentliches Gut	-
dc.subject	Gemeindesteuer	-
dc.subject	Regionales Wachstum	-
dc.subject	Steuerbelastung	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	Corrupt local government as resource farmers : the helping hand and the grabbing hand	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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