Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18860| Title: | Tax competition under minimum rates : the case of European diesel excises |
| Keywords: | H87 R4 H77 H23 ddc:330 Diesel excise strategic tax setting minimum rates European Union Dieselkraftstoff Mineralölsteuer Steuerwettbewerb EU-Steuerrecht Theorie EU-Staaten |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Description: | This paper estimates Nash-type fiscal reaction functions for European governments competing for revenue from diesel excises. It appears that European governments strategically set their excise levels by responding to their neighbors? tax rates. This provides evidence for the presence of tax competition in diesel excises. In fact, a 10 percent higher rate in neighboring countries (in terms of the user price) induces a country to raise its own rate by between 2 and 3 percent. This impact is robust for alternative specifications. By imposing restrictions on excise levels, EU harmonization of excises in 1987 and the introduction of a minimum in 1992 exerted a positive impact on the excise level in a number of EU countries. It has not, however, significantly reduced the intensity of tax competition. Indeed, strategic tax responses have not significantly been reduced by these harmonization policies. We also find that high-tax countries appear to compete more aggressively than low-tax countries in the sense that they feature larger strategic tax responses. There is no significant difference between large and small countries. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18860 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18860 ppn:390922080 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.