Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18838
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dc.creatorVogelsang, Ingo-
dc.date2005-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:01:32Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:01:32Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18838-
dc.identifierppn:488945666-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18838-
dc.descriptionPerformance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a ?used and useful? criterion.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationCESifo working papers 1474-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectL5-
dc.subjectL9-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectStromtarif-
dc.subjectStromnetz-
dc.subjectNetzzugang-
dc.subjectUnternehmensregulierung-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleElectricity transmission pricing and performance-based regulation-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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