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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18838| Title: | Electricity transmission pricing and performance-based regulation |
| Keywords: | L5 L9 ddc:330 Stromtarif Stromnetz Netzzugang Unternehmensregulierung Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a ?used and useful? criterion. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18838 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18838 ppn:488945666 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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