Silent interests and all-pay auctions

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18837

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Konrad, Kai A.	-
dc.date	2005	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:32Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:32Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18837	-
dc.identifier	ppn:488944813	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18837	-
dc.description	If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a consequence, equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocated less efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase the profits of the firms involved in the ownership relationship but without these negative efficiency effects.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1473	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	L11	-
dc.subject	D44	-
dc.subject	L41	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	all-pay auctions	-
dc.subject	externalities	-
dc.subject	contests	-
dc.subject	silent minority shareholdings	-
dc.subject	ownership structure	-
dc.subject	Auktionstheorie	-
dc.subject	Wettbewerb	-
dc.subject	Stille Gesellschaft	-
dc.subject	Eigentümerstruktur	-
dc.subject	Wirtschaftliche Effizienz	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	Silent interests and all-pay auctions	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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