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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18832| Title: | Knight fever : towards an economics of awards |
| Keywords: | Z13 L22 J33 J22 D73 D23 ddc:330 incentives motivation awards orders distinction principal-agent Preisverleihung Leistungsanreiz Sozialer Status Leistungsmotivation Agency Theory Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an individual?s desire for distinction, and the supply of awards on the provision of incentives. Relative price and income effects are shown to be identifiable and strong. A number of empirically testable propositions are formulated. As awards are (at least so far) impossible to measure adequately, empirical tests are carried out using the technique of analytic narratives. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18832 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18832 ppn:488927129 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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