A case for taxing education

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18804

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Blumkin, Tomer	-
dc.creator	Sadka, Efraim	-
dc.date	2005	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:25Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:25Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18804	-
dc.identifier	ppn:485162237	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18804	-
dc.description	We illustrate a novel informational feature of education, which the government may utilize. Discretionary decisions of individuals to acquire education may serve as an additional signal (to earned labor income) on the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby mitigating the informational constraint faced by the government. We establish a case for taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1440	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	D6	-
dc.subject	H2	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	optimal taxation	-
dc.subject	re-distribution	-
dc.subject	education	-
dc.subject	inequality	-
dc.subject	Schulfinanzierung	-
dc.subject	Optimale Besteuerung	-
dc.subject	Einkommensumverteilung	-
dc.subject	Bildungsverhalten	-
dc.subject	Signalling	-
dc.subject	Bildungsertrag	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	A case for taxing education	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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