Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18804| Title: | A case for taxing education |
| Keywords: | D6 H2 ddc:330 optimal taxation re-distribution education inequality Schulfinanzierung Optimale Besteuerung Einkommensumverteilung Bildungsverhalten Signalling Bildungsertrag Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | We illustrate a novel informational feature of education, which the government may utilize. Discretionary decisions of individuals to acquire education may serve as an additional signal (to earned labor income) on the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby mitigating the informational constraint faced by the government. We establish a case for taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18804 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18804 ppn:485162237 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.