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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18801| Title: | Intra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers |
| Keywords: | H55 H23 D82 ddc:330 pay-as-you-go externalities mechanism design adverse selection Umlageverfahren Privater Transfer Externer Effekt Generationenbeziehungen Adverse Selection Asymmetrische Information Pareto-Optimum Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfer mechanisms. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18801 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18801 ppn:485158213 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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