Intra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18801

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Kolmar, Martin	-
dc.creator	Meier, Volker	-
dc.date	2005	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:23Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:23Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18801	-
dc.identifier	ppn:485158213	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18801	-
dc.description	In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in every generation if the growth rate of the economy is positive. This result yields an alternative explanation for the existence of pay-as-you-go financed transfer mechanisms.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1437	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	H55	-
dc.subject	H23	-
dc.subject	D82	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	pay-as-you-go	-
dc.subject	externalities	-
dc.subject	mechanism design	-
dc.subject	adverse selection	-
dc.subject	Umlageverfahren	-
dc.subject	Privater Transfer	-
dc.subject	Externer Effekt	-
dc.subject	Generationenbeziehungen	-
dc.subject	Adverse Selection	-
dc.subject	Asymmetrische Information	-
dc.subject	Pareto-Optimum	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	Intra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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