Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18785
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.creatorBellettini, Giorgio-
dc.creatorCeroni, Carlotta Berti-
dc.date2005-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:01:20Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:01:20Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18785-
dc.identifierppn:484732897-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18785-
dc.descriptionThis paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the union leads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view of workers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration, we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationCESifo working papers 1421-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectJ61-
dc.subjectJ51-
dc.subjectF22-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectEinwanderung-
dc.subjectMigrationspolitik-
dc.subjectLohnpolitik-
dc.subjectGewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad-
dc.subjectWohlfahrtseffekt-
dc.subjectInteressenpolitik-
dc.subjectPublic Choice-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleWhen the union hurts the workers : a positive analysis of immigration policy-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
Appears in Collections:EconStor

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.