Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18733

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Simonovits, András	-
dc.date	2004	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:01:03Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:01:03Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733	-
dc.identifier	ppn:477488730	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18733	-
dc.description	The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is, however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1370	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	D82	-
dc.subject	H55	-
dc.subject	D91	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	flexible retirement	-
dc.subject	asymmetric information	-
dc.subject	actuarial fairness (neutrality)	-
dc.subject	mechanism design	-
dc.subject	Flexible Altersgrenze	-
dc.subject	Versicherungstechnik	-
dc.subject	Asymmetrische Information	-
dc.subject	Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion	-
dc.subject	Second Best	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

Files in This Item:

There are no files associated with this item.

DSpace JSPUI