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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18733| Title: | Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement with or without redistribution |
| Keywords: | D82 H55 D91 ddc:330 flexible retirement asymmetric information actuarial fairness (neutrality) mechanism design Flexible Altersgrenze Versicherungstechnik Asymmetrische Information Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion Second Best Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age schedule. Trying to combine the two approaches, the present paper determines the neutral (redistribution-free) second-best solution. This neutral solution is, however, often Pareto-dominated by the redistributive one. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18733 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18733 ppn:477488730 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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