Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18728
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dc.creatorMoraga-González, José Luis-
dc.creatorViaene, Jean-Marie-
dc.date2004-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:01:01Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:01:01Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18728-
dc.identifierppn:477511473-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18728-
dc.descriptionWe examine an export game where two firms (home and foreign), located in two different countries, produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is the most efficient in terms of R&D costs of quality development and the foreign country is relatively larger and endowed with a relatively higher income. The unique (risk-dominant) Nash equilibrium involves intra-industry trade where the foreign producer manufactures a good of higher quality than the domestic firm. This equilibrium is characterized by unilateral dumping by the foreign firm into the domestic economy. Two instruments of anti-dumping (AD) policy are examined, namely, a price undertaking (PU) and an anti-dumping duty. We show that, when firms? cost asymmetries are low and countries differ substantially in size, a PU leads to a quality reversal in the international market, which gives a rationale for the domestic government to enact AD law. We also establish an equivalence result between the effects of an AD duty and a PU.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationCESifo working papers 1365-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectF13-
dc.subjectF12-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectanti-dumping duty-
dc.subjectintra-industry trade-
dc.subjectprice undertaking-
dc.subjectproduct quality-
dc.subjectquality reversals-
dc.subjectAntidumping-
dc.subjectIntraindustrieller Handel-
dc.subjectSpieltheorie-
dc.subjectProduktqualität-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleAnti-dumping, intra-industry trade and quality reversals-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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