Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18725
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dc.creatorHainz, Christa-
dc.date2004-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T07:01:01Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T07:01:01Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18725-
dc.identifierppn:477509967-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18725-
dc.descriptionThe number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank?s decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers that is due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. There is also a range where improving institutions may decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisher-
dc.relationCESifo working papers 1362-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectK10-
dc.subjectG33-
dc.subjectG21-
dc.subjectD82-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectcredit markets-
dc.subjectinstitutions-
dc.subjectbank competition-
dc.subjectinformation sharing-
dc.subjectbankruptcy-
dc.subjectrelationship banking-
dc.subjectKonkurs-
dc.subjectLiquidation-
dc.subjectBankgeschäft-
dc.subjectFirmenkundengeschäft-
dc.subjectAsymmetrische Information-
dc.subjectInstitutionelle Infrastruktur-
dc.titleQuality of institutions, credit markets and bankruptcy-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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