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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18716| Title: | Optimal degree of public information dissemination |
| Keywords: | F31 D82 C73 ddc:330 transparency public information private information common p-beliefs coordination strategic complementarity Devisenmarkt Devisenspekulation Geldpolitik Staatliche Information Ankündigungseffekt Informationsverbreitung Wohlfahrtseffekt Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at driving agents? actions as close as possible to the economic fundamental state. Some studies argue that it might be better to withhold public information because its potential to serve as a focal point induces agents to exaggerate the importance of public announcements. This paper shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain condition not to all agents. Restrictions on the degree of publicity are a better instrument with which to prevent the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are. The optimal degree of publicity is always positive. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18716 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18716 ppn:477413625 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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