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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18707Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Berger, Helge | - |
| dc.creator | Mueller, Till | - |
| dc.date | 2004 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:00:57Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:00:57Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18707 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:477413463 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18707 | - |
| dc.description | The likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, in particular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in the Council. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank addressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish to insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic shocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and neither is the ?one country, one vote principle?. Empirically, there are indications that the pattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be extreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | CESifo working papers 1344 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | E52 | - |
| dc.subject | D72 | - |
| dc.subject | F33 | - |
| dc.subject | E58 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Central Bank | - |
| dc.subject | Federal Central Bank | - |
| dc.subject | Currency Union | - |
| dc.subject | optimal representation | - |
| dc.subject | voting | - |
| dc.subject | ECB | - |
| dc.subject | Zentralbank | - |
| dc.subject | Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion | - |
| dc.subject | Abstimmungsregel | - |
| dc.subject | Landesgrösse | - |
| dc.subject | Geldpolitik | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.subject | EU-Staaten | - |
| dc.title | How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union? | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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