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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18700Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Choi, Jay Pil | - |
| dc.date | 2004 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T07:00:56Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T07:00:56Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18700 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:477413749 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18700 | - |
| dc.description | Tying arrangements recently have been a major and contentious issue in many high profile antitrust cases in the US and Europe. Examples include the Microsoft case, the Visa and MasterCard case, and the proposed GE/Honeywell merger to name a few. This paper conducts a selective review of the recent developments in the analysis of tying arrangements. It also discusses relevant antitrust cases concerned with tying arrangements in light of recent theoretical advances in this area. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | - | |
| dc.relation | CESifo working papers 1336 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | L1 | - |
| dc.subject | K21 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Konzentrationspolitik | - |
| dc.subject | Price bundling | - |
| dc.subject | Marktmacht | - |
| dc.subject | Innovationswettbewerb | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Antitrust analysis of tying arrangements | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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