Long-run selection and the work ethic

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18684

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Josephson, Jens	-
dc.creator	Waerneryd, Karl	-
dc.date	2004	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T07:00:51Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T07:00:51Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18684	-
dc.identifier	ppn:477410308	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18684	-
dc.description	That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher		-
dc.relation	CESifo working papers 1319	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	Z13	-
dc.subject	M14	-
dc.subject	H41	-
dc.subject	D23	-
dc.subject	C72	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	work ethic	-
dc.subject	evolution	-
dc.subject	group selection	-
dc.subject	public goods	-
dc.subject	stochastic dynamics	-
dc.subject	Arbeitsethik	-
dc.subject	Motivation	-
dc.subject	Evolutionsökonomik	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	Long-run selection and the work ethic	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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