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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18684| Title: | Long-run selection and the work ethic |
| Keywords: | Z13 M14 H41 D23 C72 ddc:330 work ethic evolution group selection public goods stochastic dynamics Arbeitsethik Motivation Evolutionsökonomik Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | |
| Description: | That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18684 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18684 ppn:477410308 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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