Voting, Inequality, and Redistribution

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18354

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Borck, Rainald	-
dc.date	2005	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T06:59:36Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T06:59:36Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18354	-
dc.identifier	ppn:494463228	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18354	-
dc.description	his paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner; if the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor. Increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under di erent assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher	Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin	-
dc.relation	DIW-Diskussionspapiere 503	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	O15	-
dc.subject	D72	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	inequality	-
dc.subject	redistribution	-
dc.subject	voting	-
dc.subject	Einkommensumverteilung	-
dc.subject	Einkommensverteilung	-
dc.subject	Wahlverhalten	-
dc.subject	Wirtschaftsmodell	-
dc.title	Voting, Inequality, and Redistribution	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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