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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18351Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Baake, Pio | - |
| dc.creator | Mitusch, Kay | - |
| dc.date | 2005 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T06:59:36Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T06:59:36Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:494462701 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18351 | - |
| dc.description | We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin | - |
| dc.relation | DIW-Diskussionspapiere 500 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | L41 | - |
| dc.subject | L96 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | telecommunication | - |
| dc.subject | mobile phones | - |
| dc.subject | mobile-to-mobile access charges | - |
| dc.subject | network effects | - |
| dc.title | Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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