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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18351| Title: | Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation |
| Keywords: | L41 L96 ddc:330 telecommunication mobile phones mobile-to-mobile access charges network effects |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
| Description: | We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18351 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351 ppn:494462701 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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