Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18315| Title: | Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives |
| Keywords: | ddc:330 Buyer power ; Merger ; Retailing Nachfragemacht Marktstruktur Wohlfahrtseffekt Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
| Description: | This paper argues that - in contrast to an often expressed view - the formation of larger and more powerful buyers need not reduce welfare by stifling suppliers´ incentives. If contracts are determined in bilateral negotiations, the presence of larger buyers may both increase suppliers´incentives for product improvement and induce suppliers to choose a more efficient technology. The paper also isolates two di¤erent channels by which larger buyers can obtain a discount. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18315 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18315 ppn:47865720X |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.