Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18315
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dc.creatorInderst, Roman-
dc.creatorWey, Christian-
dc.date2005-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T06:59:28Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T06:59:28Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18315-
dc.identifierppn:47865720X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18315-
dc.descriptionThis paper argues that - in contrast to an often expressed view - the formation of larger and more powerful buyers need not reduce welfare by stifling suppliers´ incentives. If contracts are determined in bilateral negotiations, the presence of larger buyers may both increase suppliers´incentives for product improvement and induce suppliers to choose a more efficient technology. The paper also isolates two di¤erent channels by which larger buyers can obtain a discount.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin-
dc.relationDIW-Diskussionspapiere 464-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectBuyer power ; Merger ; Retailing-
dc.subjectNachfragemacht-
dc.subjectMarktstruktur-
dc.subjectWohlfahrtseffekt-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleBuyer Power and Supplier Incentives-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
Appears in Collections:EconStor

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