Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18281

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Borck, Rainald	-
dc.date	2002	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T06:59:16Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T06:59:16Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18281	-
dc.identifier	ppn:361577303	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18281	-
dc.description	This paper shows that stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion. Individuals vote on a linear income tax which is used to finance lump sum transfers. Stricter enforcement may make redistributive taxation more attractive to the decisive voter. The tax rate and transfer may rise which in turn may increase tax evasion. An example shows that this result can actually occur. The paper also discusses the interaction between voting on taxes and the choice of audit rate by a budget maximizing bureaucrat.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher	Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin	-
dc.relation	DIW-Diskussionspapiere 297	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	H26	-
dc.subject	D72	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	Tax evasion	-
dc.subject	enforcement	-
dc.subject	voting	-
dc.subject	Einkommensteuer	-
dc.subject	Finanzverwaltung	-
dc.subject	Steuerliche Betriebsprüfung	-
dc.subject	Steuerstraftat	-
dc.subject	Sozialtransfer	-
dc.subject	Public Choice	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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