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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18279| Title: | Managerial incentives, innovation and product market competition |
| Keywords: | O32 L22 D20 C72 ddc:330 Strategic Delegation Managerial Incentives R&D competition and R&D collusion Industrielle Forschung Wettbewerb Duopol Führungskräfte Leistungsanreiz Vertrag Anreizvertrag Spieltheorie Forschungskooperation Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
| Description: | This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost-reducing R&D, and have higher output, lower prices and lower profits, as compared to profit-maximizers in an owner-run game. Secondly, we find that R&D collusion induces owners in a delegation game to choose more aggressive managerial incentives as compared to R&D competition, which in turn leads to increased R&D investment, reduced product prices and increased profits. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18279 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18279 ppn:353286915 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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