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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18279Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Zhang, Zhentang | - |
| dc.date | 2002 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T06:59:16Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T06:59:16Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18279 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:353286915 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18279 | - |
| dc.description | This paper investigates the strategic value of the managerial incentive scheme in affecting firms' incentive in R&D investment and their product market activities. Firstly, we find that in Cournot-quantity competition, owners strategically assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost-reducing R&D, and have higher output, lower prices and lower profits, as compared to profit-maximizers in an owner-run game. Secondly, we find that R&D collusion induces owners in a delegation game to choose more aggressive managerial incentives as compared to R&D competition, which in turn leads to increased R&D investment, reduced product prices and increased profits. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin | - |
| dc.relation | DIW-Diskussionspapiere 295 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | O32 | - |
| dc.subject | L22 | - |
| dc.subject | D20 | - |
| dc.subject | C72 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Strategic Delegation | - |
| dc.subject | Managerial Incentives | - |
| dc.subject | R&D competition and R&D collusion | - |
| dc.subject | Industrielle Forschung | - |
| dc.subject | Wettbewerb | - |
| dc.subject | Duopol | - |
| dc.subject | Führungskräfte | - |
| dc.subject | Leistungsanreiz | - |
| dc.subject | Vertrag | - |
| dc.subject | Anreizvertrag | - |
| dc.subject | Spieltheorie | - |
| dc.subject | Forschungskooperation | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Managerial incentives, innovation and product market competition | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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