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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18168Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Schröder, Philipp J. H. | - |
| dc.date | 2004 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T06:58:34Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T06:58:34Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18168 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:390960861 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18168 | - |
| dc.description | This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other?s markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, thus integration is pro-competitive. If integration consists of a reductions in unit (fixed) trade costs a price setting cartel is strengthened (unaffected), while a quantity setting one is weakened. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin | - |
| dc.relation | DIW-Diskussionspapiere 432 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | F15 | - |
| dc.subject | F12 | - |
| dc.subject | L12 | - |
| dc.subject | L13 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Collusive behavior | - |
| dc.subject | trade liberalisation | - |
| dc.subject | specific tariffs | - |
| dc.subject | market access cost | - |
| dc.subject | Kartell | - |
| dc.subject | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | - |
| dc.subject | Aussenhandelsliberalisierung | - |
| dc.subject | Wirtschaftsintegration | - |
| dc.subject | Zolltheorie | - |
| dc.subject | Kosten | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Cartel Stability and Economic Integration | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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